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Introduction 
The World Wide Web (hereafter simply referred to as the Web) is a large-scale digital compendium 
of information that covers practically every sphere of human interest and endeavour. For this reason 
it should come as no surprise that the Web has been an important focus of attention for the 
epistemological community. To date, search engines (Heintz, 2006; Miller & Record, 2013; Simpson, 
2012), Wikipedia (Coady, 2012; Fallis, 2008, 2011) and the blogosphere (Coady, 2012; Goldman, 
2008) have all been the targets of epistemological debate and discussion. A range of other important 
systems, however, seems to have fallen beneath the philosophical radar. These systems include 
microblogging platforms, (e.g., Twitter), social networking sites (e.g., Facebook), citizen science 
projects (e.g. Galaxy Zoo), and human computation systems (e.g., Foldit). All of these systems are of 
potential relevance to our individual and collective epistemic endeavours. One of the aims of this 
chapter is to introduce the reader to these systems and highlight their relevance to applied 
epistemology. A second aim is to review existing epistemological analyses of the Web, and, where 
necessary, point out problems with the philosophical narrative. A third, and final, objective is to 
highlight areas where the interests of epistemologists (both theoretical and applied) may be seen to 
overlap with the interests of those who seek to understand and engineer the Web. One of the 
outcomes of this analysis is a better understanding of the way in which contemporary epistemology 
can be incorporated into the nascent discipline of web science (Berners-Lee et al., 2006).    
Personalized Search: Epistemic Boon or Burden 
One of the major areas of epistemological enquiry into the Web concerns the epistemic impact of 
search engines, such as Google Search (Miller & Record, 2013; Simpson, 2012). A particular focus of 
attention relates to the effect of personalized search mechanisms, which filter search results based 
on a user’s prior history of search activity. Such mechanisms, it is claimed, can result in ‘filter 
bubbles’ (see Pariser, 2011), which have the effect of limiting a user’s awareness of important bodies 
of epistemically-relevant information. Epistemologists are largely in agreement concerning the 
negative effects of personalized search. Simpson (2012), for example, argues that filter bubbles 
accentuate the problem of confirmation bias and undermine users’ access to objective information. 
Similar views are expressed by Miller and Record (2013). They claim that the justificatory status of an 
agent’s beliefs are undermined as a result of exposure to personalized search results. 
Concerns about the epistemic sequelae of personalized search has led epistemologists to make a 
number of practical suggestions as to how to avoid filter bubbles, or at least minimize their 
epistemic effects. Simpson (2012) thus suggests that users should turn off personalization, or resort 
to search engines that do not use personalization mechanisms (he cites DuckDuckGo as a prime 
example). Simpson also suggests that there is a prima facie case to be made for government 
regulation of search engine providers. Echoing the views of Introna and Nissenbaum (2000), he 
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argues that search engines are in the business of providing an important public service, and that 
there is an important public good (objective search results, in this case) that is failing to be achieved.  
Other proposals to address the problem of personalized search centre on the epistemic 
responsibilities of Web users. Miller and Record (2013) thus suggest that search engine users “can 
use existing competencies for gaining information from traditional media such as newspapers to 
supplement internet-filtered information and therefore at least partly satisfy the responsibility to 
determine whether it is biased or incomplete” (p. 130).  
Finally, Knight (2014) draws attention to the efforts of computer scientists in developing ‘diversity-
aware search’ techniques. These are deemed to enable users to break out of their filter bubbles via 
the active inclusion of ‘diverse’ information in search results.  
We thus have a range of proposals relating to the practical steps that could be (and perhaps should 
be) taken by users to obviate the negative effects of personalized search. But before we accept such 
proposals we should at least question the (largely implicit) assumption upon which all of these 
proposals are based. Do personalized search engines really undermine the epistemic status of their 
users? If so, are we justified in condemning personalized search engines on account of their poor 
veritistic value? In answering these questions we suggest it helps to be aware of a range of issues 
that, to our knowledge, have not been the focus of debates relating to the epistemological 
significance of contemporary search engines. 
The first issue to consider focuses on the way in which a search engine is actually used. Waller 
(2011), for example, discovered that almost half (i.e., 48%) of the queries entered by search engine 
users appeared to be directed towards the retrieval of information about a specific website. In other 
words, it seemed that users were relying on a search engine, at least in part, as a means of providing 
quick and easy access to a website that they already knew existed. These findings are important 
because they suggest that search engines may not be used solely to discover new information; they 
may also be used to access bodies of information that a user is already aware of. When seen in this 
light, it is far from clear that personalized search mechanisms are working against the epistemic 
interests of the user. In fact, there is perhaps a risk that by interfering with personalization 
mechanisms, we will disrupt a set of well-honed techniques for quickly and efficiently accessing 
familiar bodies of task-relevant information.   
A second issue to consider relates to the broader ecological setting in which search engines are used. 
Here we suggest that epistemological analyses can benefit from the sort of perspectives that have 
long been embraced by the cognitive science community concerning the situated and 
environmentally-embedded nature of cognition (Robbins & Aydede, 2009). In particular, we suggest 
that it is helpful to think of Web users as embedded in multiple networks of information flow and 
influence, each of which presents the user with a diverse (even if filtered) stream of facts, ideas and 
opinions. This broader informational ecology might thus work to mitigate the negative epistemic 
effects of personalized search (if indeed there are any). A concept that is of particular value here is 
the notion of network individualism (Rainie & Wellman, 2012). Networked individualism describes 
the way in which society is changing as a result of the introduction of new media technology. In 
particular, it emphasizes the manner in which people now connect, communicate and exchange 
information following the advent of the Web and the growth of mobile communications technology. 
According to Rainie and Wellman (2012), society is increasingly being organized along the lines of 
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multiple, overlapping social networks in which membership and participation is both fluid and 
dynamic. As a result of these changes, individuals are likely to be exposed to multiple sources of 
heterogeneous information, and this may help to allay concerns about the selective exposure effects 
that filter bubbles are deemed to produce. The main point, here, is simply that a user’s informational 
ecology is not exhausted by the nature of their interaction with a particular search engine. When the 
epistemological debate over search engines is set in the context of this broader informational 
ecology, the epistemic threat posed by personalized search may, in fact, turn out to be quite limited. 
Finally, a more positive perspective on personalized search is provided by the notion of ‘mandevillian 
intelligence’ (Smart, forthcoming-b). Mandevillian intelligence is a form of collective intelligence in 
which the cognitive shortcomings and epistemic vices of the individual epistemic agent may play a 
productive role in yielding cognitive benefits and epistemic virtues at level of collective doxastic 
agents (see Palermos, 2015) or socio-epistemic systems (see Goldman, 2011). When seen through 
the lens of mandevillian intelligence, the epistemic impact of personalized search mechanisms can, 
we suggest, be seen in a whole new light. For such mechanisms can be seen to accentuate what is 
typically cast as an individual epistemic vice (i.e., selective information exposure or cognitive bias) 
and translate it into what is undoubtedly a collective epistemic benefit (i.e., greater coverage of the 
information space and deeper processing of epistemically-relevant information) (see Smart, 
forthcoming-b, for more details). This possibility draws attention to a possible tension in how we 
interpret the veritistic value of a particular technology or epistemic practice: veritistic value may vary 
according to whether we focus our attention at the individual or collective (social) level of analysis. 
Web-Extended Knowledge 
One of the ways in which epistemologists have sought to understand the epistemic effects of the 
Web is by drawing on externalist approaches to mind and cognition (see Clark, 2008). According to 
the notion of active externalism, for example, the causally-active physical vehicles that realize 
mental states and processes can sometimes extend beyond the traditional biological borders of the 
brain (and body) to include a variety of non-biological (i.e., extra-organismic) resources (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998). This idea is sometimes presented as a thesis about the explanatory kinds of 
interest to cognitive science (in which case it is commonly referred to as the Hypothesis of Extended 
Cognition or HEC), and sometimes it is presented as a thesis about mentalistic folk categories, such 
as states of belief (in which case it is commonly referred to as the Extended Mind Thesis or EMT). 
With respect to the EMT, it has been suggested that the nature of our interaction with the Web 
might be sufficient (at least in some cases) to lead to the emergence of Web-extended minds; i.e., 
forms of bio-technological merger in which the Web serves as part of the realization base for some 
of our folk psychological mental states, most notably states of dispositional belief (Smart, 2012). This 
possibility has been discussed in relation to a number of criteria that have been proposed to limit 
the situations in which we can expect to encounter genuine cases of cognitive extension (see Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998). Smart (2012) thus talks about the Web in terms of the opportunities it provides for 
quick and easy access to online information and the way in which these opportunities speak to at 
least one of the criteria for cognitive extension, namely the accessibility criterion (see Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998).     
Recently, the notion of Web-extended minds has led epistemologists to make a number of claims 
regarding the impact of the Web on our epistemic profile. One implication of the Web-extended 
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mind concept, Ludwig (2015) argues, is that we are able to envisage a profound transformation of 
our doxastic potential. In particular, he anticipates “an explosion of dispositional beliefs and 
knowledge that is caused by digital information resources such as Wikipedia or Google” (p. 355). 
Similar views are expressed by Bjerring and Pedersen (2014). They argue that the Web enables us to 
enjoy various forms of ‘restricted epistemic omniscience’, wherein we have more-or-less “complete 
knowledge about a particular, fairly specific subject matter” (p. 25). We thus arrive at a claim that 
seems to follow quite naturally from the possibility of Web-extended minds:  
Web-Extended Knowledge Hypothesis 
Cognitively-potent forms of bio-technological union between human agents and the 
Web will lead to states of Web-extended knowledge in which many of our epistemically-
relevant doxastic states supervene on material elements that are typically treated as 
part of the technological and informational fabric of the Web. 
Unfortunately, there are a number of problems confronting this hypothesis. One of the most 
pressing problems relates to the way in which attempts to satisfy the criteria for cognitive extension 
(i.e., those proposed by Clark and Chalmers) seem to cause problems for the epistemic integrity of 
the technologically-extended agent (Smart, in press). In order to get a grip on this, consider the 
accessibility criterion proposed by Clark and Chalmers (1998). The general idea is that external 
information should be quickly and easily accessible – it should be possible for agents to draw on 
external information whenever it is required and easily incorporate this information to their 
problem-solving routines. Accessibility thus seems to demand a degree of fluency with respect to the 
kind of interaction an agent has with bio-external resources, where the notion of fluency can be 
understood (at least in part) as the “subjective experience of ease or difficulty with which we are 
able to process information” (Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 237).    
Now, the problem with claims regarding easy access and fluent interaction is that these properties 
seem to be in some tension with the possibility of Web-extended forms of knowledge. Thus, one of 
the key insights to emerge from research on fluency is that fluent processing is often associated with 
a truth bias, in which the ‘truth’ of some body of external information is judged relative to the 
subjective ease with which it is processed (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Fluency thus seems to speak 
in favour of the possibility of Web-extended minds, but it seems to work against the interests of 
Web-extended knowers (i.e., agents whose epistemic credentials are enhanced as a result of Web-
based forms of cognitive extension). We thus encounter the following problem (see Smart, in press):  
Extended Cognizer vs. Extended Knower Problem 
The properties that work to ensure that an external resource can be treated as a 
candidate for cognitive incorporation are also, at least in some cases, the very same 
properties that work to undermine or endanger the positive epistemic standing of a 
technologically-extended agent. 
The presence of this tension between extended cognizers and extended knowers may work to 
undermine the view that Web-extended minds are the natural harbingers of Web-extended 
knowledge.  
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Epistemic Feelings 
In addition to ideas concerning the possibility of Web-extended knowledge and Web-extended 
knowers, there is an additional way in which active externalism may be of relevance to 
epistemological debates concerning the Web. This is revealed by the results of recent empirical 
studies investigating the effect of Web access on subjective, epistemically-relevant experiences, such 
as the ‘feeling of knowing’ (Fisher et al., 2015; Ward, 2013). The feeling of knowing is one of a range 
of epistemic feelings that have been studied by epistemologists (Michaelian & Arango-Muñoz, 
2014). It concerns the subjective sense that one is able to access some desired piece of information 
(e.g., the answer to a question), typically as a result of retrieving the information from memory. In 
situations where people use the Web to search for online information, however, it seems that this 
feeling of knowing ‘extends’ to include the content contained on the Web. In other words, it seems 
as though our sense of what we know is not limited by whatever information is made available by 
the operation of our biological, brain-based memory systems. Searching for information online, 
Fisher et al. (2015) suggests, thus “leads people to conflate information that can be found online 
with knowledge in the head.” Similarly, Ward (2013) notes that as people turn to the “cloud mind of 
the Internet, they seem to lose sight of where their own minds end and the mind of the Internet 
begins. They become one with the cloud, believing that they themselves are spectacularly adept 
about at thinking about, remembering, and locating information” (p. 88). 
These findings are significant because they have long been anticipated by those working in the active 
externalist camp. In 2007, for example, Clark proposed that our subjective sense of what we know is 
informed by the kind of access we have to bio-external information: 
“Easy access to specific bodies of information, as and when such access is normally 
required, is all it takes for us to factor such knowledge in as part of the bundle of skills 
and abilities that we take for granted in our day to day life. And it is this bundle of 
taken-for-granted skills, knowledge, and abilities that...quite properly structures and 
informs our sense of who we are, what we know, and what we can do.” (Clark, 2007, p. 
106) 
Such comments seem particularly prescient in view of the findings by Ward (2013) and Fisher et al. 
(2015). Although feelings of knowing are clearly not sufficient to count as knowledge in an 
epistemological sense, they do highlight the potential relevance of active externalist accounts in 
informing our understanding of the way in which the Web contributes to a subjective shift in what 
we regard as our own epistemic capabilities. From the perspective of applied epistemology, we will 
need to consider to what extent such subjective shifts reliably track what we do in fact know. We 
will also need to consider the extent to which such feelings influence our tendency to engage in a 
range of other epistemically-relevant processes and practices (e.g., those that might help to ensure 
the modal stability of our beliefs across close possible worlds).  
Social Machines 
Despite the fact that the Web is a relatively recent phenomenon, its use has become so routine and 
familiar as to merit very little attention concerning the way in which it scaffolds and supports our 
everyday activities. A moment’s reflection, however, will reveal that the Web now plays a very 
important role in the functioning of our society. The sudden disappearance of the Web would cause 
a catastrophic collapse of society, on a par perhaps with that resulting from a coordinated nuclear 
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strike (this is, of course, somewhat ironic given that the Web emerged on the back of research 
efforts to support the continued functioning of society in the face of a nuclear attack!). For this 
reason, it is appropriate to think of the Web as a form of critical infrastructure for society, 
resembling the more traditional elements of national infrastructure, such as the transportation 
system and electricity distribution networks. Arguably, the reason why the Web has emerged to 
occupy this role is because of the way in which it is has managed to integrate itself into practically 
every form of social life. Very few of our individual and collective endeavours are now undertaken 
without some sort of Web-based mediation or involvement. In fact, what seems to have happened is 
that, over time, the Web has become increasingly intertwined with the structures and processes that 
make up our society. Social and technological processes have thus become inextricably linked, to the 
point where the Web has emerged as something of a socio-technologically integrated system, a 
system in which all manner of processes involve the coordinated efforts of both human agents and 
technological resources.  
This vision of socio-technical integration lies at the heart of an important concept that has emerged 
in the context of the web science literature. This is the concept of ‘social machines’ (Smart & 
Shadbolt, 2014). Social machines are systems in which human and (Web-based) machine elements 
participate in the joint realization of a process. In such cases, the human and machine elements are 
said to play the role of participant machinery with respect to the mechanistic realization of a 
process; i.e., they form part of the machinery by means of which a process is physically realized. 
Contemporary social machines are typically centred around Web applications and services that 
feature significant levels of user participation. Some notable examples include Google Search, 
Wikipedia, Galaxy Zoo and Foldit. 
Epistemological analyses of social machines have typically focused on Google Search (see above) and 
Wikipedia (Coady, 2012; Fallis, 2008, 2011); other kinds social machines, however, have been the 
focus of relatively less attention. This is unfortunate because social machines are involved in a 
multitude of epistemically-relevant tasks. This is particularly apparent in the case of social machines 
that participate in the acquisition and discovery of knowledge. One notable class of systems, in this 
respect, are citizen science systems, such as Galaxy Zoo (Lintott et al., 2008). These have grown in 
prominence over recent years, to the point where it is probably not unfair to suggest that they 
should be seen as a part of the arsenal of techniques and practices that scientists can exploit as part 
of the scientific enterprise. Such characterizations are sufficient to make citizen science systems 
worthy of epistemological attention, especially given the interest in applying epistemological theory 
to the understanding and analysis of scientific processes (e.g., Palermos, 2015).  
Another important class of social machines are ones that seek to incorporate human agents into 
some of form of computational processing. These systems are commonly referred to as human 
computation systems (Law & von Ahn, 2011). One example of such a system is the online puzzle 
game, Foldit (Cooper et al., 2010), which draws on the pattern matching and spatial reasoning 
abilities of human participants as part of a computational process that predicts the structural 
properties of protein molecules. The role of the human participants, in these sorts of systems, 
should not be underestimated. In many cases, the kind of task being performed by the larger socio-
technical ensemble – the one involving both human and machine elements – is not one that could 
be (easily) performed in the absence of the (often large-scale) socio-technical infrastructure that 
social machines make available. This is something that is often explicitly recognized by those who 
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seek to exploit the epistemic outputs of social machines. In one of the early papers published in 
respect of the Foldit system, for example, the authors of the paper explicitly acknowledged the 
contributions made by more than 57,000 users of the Foldit system (Cooper et al., 2010). 
One of the things that is revealed by a consideration of citizen science and human computation 
systems is the extent to which social machines draw on the complementary contributions of both 
human and machine elements. Human agents are thus the locus of particular kinds of capability that 
subtend the epistemic, cognitive, perceptual, behavioural, social, moral, emotional, affective and 
aesthetic domains; computing technologies, in contrast, are renowned for their speed of processing, 
their ability to engage in repetitive symbolic manipulation, their capacity for digital data storage, and 
so on. By bringing these diverse capabilities together in the context of a complex task, social 
machines are potentially poised to extend the reach of both human and machine intelligence. Issues 
of social penetration and entrenchment are of particular importance here. For the Web enables us 
to tap into the capabilities of human agents in a manner (and on a scale) that has never been seen 
before. And, by virtue of this penetration into the human social environment, the Web opens up a 
range of opportunities to incorporate human agents into episodes of machine-based processing. This 
has implications for our notions of machine intelligence (Smart, forthcoming-a), but it also opens up 
a range of opportunities for social machines to participate in the acquisition of highly reliable 
information about states-of-affairs in the physical and social environment, thereby contributing to 
our knowledge and understanding of the wider world. Some notable examples here include the use 
of mobile networked devices to record information about the location of potholes in city road 
networks (Carrera et al., 2013), as well as the use of query-based syndromic surveillance techniques 
to support the prediction and monitoring of disease outbreaks (Ginsberg et al., 2009). 
Network Epistemology 
The scientific study of social machines forms an important part of what is now referred to as web 
science (Berners-Lee et al., 2006). One of the goals of the social machine research effort is to gain a 
better understanding of the factors that influence the performance profile of social machines 
relative to the kinds of tasks in which they are involved. An issue of particular interest (and 
importance) concerns the way in which different configurations of the social and technological 
elements (characterized in terms of information flow patterns) are best suited to the performance of 
particular tasks. By advancing our understanding in this area, web scientists hope to be in a position 
to support the adaptive configuration of social machines and thus improve their overall performance 
profile.  
It is here that we encounter a potentially productive point of contact between the scientific goals of 
social machine researchers and the philosophical endeavours of social epistemologists. Goldman 
(2011), for example, identifies a specific form of social epistemology, called ‘systems-oriented social 
epistemology’, whose primary objective is to understand the veritistic value of different kinds of 
socially-distributed epistemic practice and social organization. This, it should be clear, is very much 
in accord with the goals of social machine researchers. It is also something that is well-aligned with a 
body of work in network science that seeks to illuminate the ways in which the topological structure 
of social networks influences the dynamics of belief formation and collective cognitive processing 
within a community of interacting cognitive agents (Glinton et al., 2010; Kearns, 2012). Such forms 
of computational social epistemology, or network epistemology (see Zollman, 2013), promise to 
inform our understanding of the complex interactions that occur between forces and factors at the 
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cognitive, social and technological levels, as well as the ways in which these interactions influence 
the epistemic properties (e.g., truth tracking capabilities) of both individual agents and socio-
epistemic systems.  
An Epistemically Safe Environment? 
One issue that typically arises in debates about the epistemic impact of the Web concerns the extent 
to which the Web can serve as a source of reliable information. At first sight, it would seem that the 
open and democratic nature of the Web (the fact that anyone can participation in the creation of 
online content) poses something of a problem for reliability. Ever since the advent of Web 2.0, users 
have been able to play an active role in the generation of online content, and most users, via their 
use of resources such as Twitter and Facebook, participate in content creation without giving it a 
second thought. The problem, of course, is that by enabling anyone to add or edit content we run of 
risk of contaminating the online environment with misleading and inaccurate information. The 
online environment thus seems to be one that is rife with a range of epistemic risks and hazards, and 
these seem to pose a threat to the epistemic standing of anyone who relies on it. In the face of these 
risks and hazards, is there any reason to think that Web users can rely on the Web as a source of 
information regarding their beliefs about the world? 
One way of responding to this question draws on the earlier discussion relating to social machines. 
In particular, when we pay attention to the way in which social machines operate what we 
encounter are forms of social participation that are of such scale that they typically dwarf the kind of 
social participation seen in the case of more conventional socio-technical systems (e.g., aircraft 
carriers and airline cockpits). Large-scale social participation, in these cases, often helps to improve 
the reliability of whatever outputs are generated by the larger systemic organization. In the case of 
Google’s PageRank algorithm, for example, we see an attempt to exploit the linking behaviour of 
human users on a global scale. Such exploitation helps to ensure that the efforts of a (hopefully) 
small community of mendacious or malign agents will be swamped by the efforts of more virtuously-
minded individuals. This sort of redundancy with respect to user contributions is something that is 
commonly encountered in the case of social machines. For example, many kinds of human 
computation or citizen science system rely on inputs from multiple independent users as a means of 
improving reliability. The mechanisms employed by social machines are also ones that are, in many 
cases, very difficult to sabotage. When it comes to Google Search, for example, specific individuals 
may try to ‘artificially’ elevate the ranking afforded to their own contributions. However, given the 
globally-distributed nature of the linking effort, coupled with the fact that links to a specific resource 
are themselves weighted by the ranking of the resource from which the link originates, it will be 
prove extremely hard (absent some large-scale coordinated effort) to achieve the kind of 
endorsement that would be reflected in the results of the PageRank algorithm. 
Reliability Indicators and Trust 
In addition to social machines, trust is another topic that is a mainstay of contemporary web science 
research (Golbeck, 2006). Trust is also a topic that is of obvious relevance to epistemological inquiry; 
a fact that is perhaps best evidenced by work concerning the issue of testimonial knowledge (Lackey, 
2011). The fact that so much of our knowledge is based on the testimony of others raises questions 
regarding the kind of conditions under which we are justified in believing what others tells us. In the 
context of face-to-face encounters, of course, there are a variety of cues – or, in the terminology of 
Craig (1990), ‘indicator properties’ – that could potentially guide our decisions as to who we should 
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trust to provide reliable information (Sperber et al., 2010). Such cues are likely to play an important 
role in influencing decisions regarding who we select as a source of information (i.e., an informant), 
as well as the extent to which we endorse the information they provide (e.g., we may reject their 
testimony if they show signs of dishonesty or incompetence while communicating information). By 
being responsive to such cues, it seems that we can exercise considerable ability with respect to the 
epistemically-virtuous selection and endorsement of sources of testimonial information, a claim 
which is broadly consistent with the tenets of virtue reliabilistic approaches to knowledge (Greco, 
2007). In particular, by being reliable receivers of testimony, we are able to see our cognitive abilities 
as an important and necessary part of explanatory accounts as to why we believe the truth in 
testimonial exchanges. 
Once we turn our attention away from face-to-face encounters, however, and focus on the Web as a 
source of information, we encounter a problem. In particular, the kinds of cues that inform our 
attempts at epistemic hygiene in the case of face-to-face social interactions are not so readily 
available in the online environment. This is especially true in situations where the user needs to 
evaluate the reliability of content that derives from an anonymous or unknown source – a situation 
that is all-too-common given the open and democratic nature of the contemporary Web. In these 
cases, we might be inclined to say that the Web provides a lack of cues that can be used to guide 
epistemic judgements. In order to evaluate this claim, it is important to gain a better understanding 
of the kind of reliability indicators that are available on the Web, as well as the extent to which these 
indicators are actually exploited by Web users in judging the reliability of online content.  
In terms of the information that is presented on a typical website, studies have revealed that user 
credibility judgements tend to be informed by a range of relatively superficial features, such as the 
website’s appearance, structure and navigability (Metzger, 2007; Wathen & Burkell, 2002). In a 
large-scale study involving more than 2500 participants, for example, Fogg et al. (2003) discovered 
that the visual design of a website was one of the most important factors in terms of influencing 
credibility judgements. Other studies have explored the relevance of social cues to credibility 
assessments. Westerman et al. (2012) thus investigated the relationship between perceptions of 
source credibility and the number of followers an individual appeared to have in the context of the 
Twitter microblogging system. These results revealed the presence of a curvilinear relationship, with 
too few or too many followers having a negative impact on judgements related to expertise and 
trustworthiness.  
The problem with the sorts of cues investigated by these studies (i.e., site design features, number 
of Twitter followers, etc.) is that they are relatively easy to fake. Site designs are something that can 
be easily improved upon, and fake Twitter accounts are relatively easy to manufacture. Ideally, what 
is required is a set of cues that reliably indicate the reliability of online content. The question, 
therefore, is to what extent do we find these more reliable sorts of reliability indicator on the Web?  
In fact, such indicators are available, and, as with almost everything on the Web, they rely heavily on 
the fact that the Web is as much a social environment as it is a technological one. Taraborelli (2008) 
provides a useful summary of such indicators. They include: 
1. implicit indicators of individual endorsement (such as indicators that a specific user 
selected/visited/purchased an item); 
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2. explicit indicators of individual endorsement (such as explicit ratings produced by specific 
users);  
3. implicit indicators of socially aggregated endorsement (such as density of bookmarks or 
comments per item in social bookmarking systems); 
4. explicit indicators of socially aggregated endorsement (such as average ratings extracted 
from a user community);  
5. algorithmic endorsement indicators (such as PageRank and similar usage independent 
ranking algorithms);  
6. hybrid endorsement indicators (such as interestingness indicators in Flickr, taking into 
account both explicit user endorsement and usage-independent metrics). 
All of these indicators, it should be clear, are ones that rely, to a greater or lesser extent, on the 
behaviour of other users. They are, as such, reminiscent of work in the social psychological literature 
that seeks to investigate the phenomenon of social proof (Cialdini, 2007). As work in that area 
suggests, a tendency to rely on the actions of others does not always yield positive results. 
Sometimes it can lead to herd behaviour, and, in an epistemic context, there is a risk that users will 
erroneously equate popularity with reliability. Nevertheless, there are, it seems, a rich variety of 
cues that users can exploit as part of the epistemically-virtuous selection and endorsement of online 
content, and these cues do seem to play an important role in guiding users’ actual judgements as to 
the credibility of online content (Metzger et al., 2010). It thus seems that rather than being an 
environment which is deficient or impoverished with respect to the availability of reliability-
indicating cues, the Web may, in fact, afford access to cues that are both more varied and (perhaps) 
more reliable than those encountered in the case of face-to-face testimonial contexts. Key issues for 
future research in this area relate to how the features of the online socio-technical environment can 
be used to support the construction, evaluation and validation of epistemically-relevant indicator 
properties. It will also be important, in future research, to assess the extent to which socially-
constructed indicator properties are immune to the various forms of epistemic injustice that have 
been discussed in the epistemological literature (see Fricker, 2003).  
Conclusion 
The Web provides access to a digital compendium of information that is unprecedented in terms of 
its scale, scope and accessibility. It is, in addition, a resource that shapes our epistemic power and 
potential: few of our epistemic projects and endeavours are undertaken without recourse to the 
Web at some point. The Web is, as such, a valuable form of epistemic infrastructure for our species, 
influencing the kind of beliefs we form and providing a platform for us to discover, manage and 
exploit epistemic resources. As a discipline whose primary focus is to understand the factors that 
influence our epistemic capabilities and standing, at both the individual and collective levels, applied 
epistemology is ideally situated to assist with our attempts to understand the Web and shape the 
course of its future development. 
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